@article{oai:serve.repo.nii.ac.jp:00000390,
 author = {谷口, 隆一郎},
 issue = {第1号},
 journal = {聖学院大学論叢, The Journal of Seigakuin University},
 month = {Mar},
 note = {I critically examine Richard Rorty’s attempt at unweaving the intertwining lore of philosophical notions of truth―the lore that has been handed on to philosophers today particularly through two branches of philosophical traditions: one is analytic, from F. L. G. Frege through Rudolf Carnap to W. V. O. Quine; the other is pragmatic, from C. S. Peirce through William James to John Dewey. Rorty, who wants to make the former overridden by the latter, presses that the former lore of truth had been debunked not so much wrong as useless. His notorious tenet on truth can be epitomized as follows: we should slough off the metaphysical use of the words “true” and “truth” in the way philosophers in the Western philosophical tradition have put them to use because they have no explanatory use, but are merely endorsing, cautionary, and disquotational uses of the words. Coupled with this is his claim that we should employ a notion of justification in exchange for notions of truth. I first expose the basic weakness in his  defense of that notion by juxtaposing it with Michael Dummett’s justificationalism. Following Dummett’s criticism of Rorty that Rorty heedlessly presupposes meaning without discussion in discussing truth asserted in sentences, I maintain that Rorty should have conferred on his theory of justification an explanation as to how the meanings of words and sentences of our languages are given to us. I hold that, following the lore of pragmatist fathers on truth as what works, we should not cancel out the notion of truth as altogether useless. I conclude that justification sans explanation through notions of truth and meaning cannot be counted as justified even on the basis of the pragmatic lore.},
 pages = {145--177},
 title = {真理なしで正当化は正当化されるのか : リチャード・ローティの正当化の概念},
 volume = {第21巻},
 year = {2009},
 yomi = {タニグチ, リュウイチロウ}
}